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Abstract
Malaysia has relied on toll road public-private partnerships (PPPs) for over twenty years to
provide important highway infrastructure.  The program has been active with nearly 1800
kilometers either constructed or concessions agreed to.  The public has been less supportive of
the program due to low transparency and little public involvement.  Public protests are common,
which may lead to long-term program instability.  The CLIOS Process, developed at MIT, is
applied to Malaysia’s toll road PPP program to develop new policies that can better meet these
public concerns while maintaining the financial viability of the sector.  With increases in
transparency and public involvement, the political risks of the program should be reduced and
long-term stability for the government and concessionaires improved.  We argue that the focus
should be at the regional transportation planning level where toll road PPPs can be compared
with alternatives for meeting transportation needs rather than at the national level where
Malaysian toll road PPPs are currently handled.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Malaysia shifted its policies from emphasizing state ownership of enterprises to
advocating privatization of state industries, including roads.  Since then, the government has
relied heavily on toll road public-private partnerships (PPPs) to achieve its highway expansion
goals.  In the past two decades, 1800 km of toll roads have either been constructed or concession
agreements signed with the private sector for their construction, providing much of the highway
expansion over this time.  In this regard, the program is successful and it is expected that the
government will continue to rely on toll road PPPs.
The program is not without controversy.  The lack of transparency in the concessionaire
selection process has led to accusations of cronyism.  Public involvement is minimal during this
process, also.  This has resulted in protests over tolls with the government reducing or delaying
planned increases, especially in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Continuance of
these policies could lead to destabilization of the toll road PPP sector as political opponents take
advantage of public dissatisfaction.
This paper has two purposes.  First, it recommends alternative policies for the Malaysian toll
road PPP program that are expected to strengthen its long-term prospects.  These
recommendations were developed as part of broader research into Malaysia’s toll road program
in Ward (1) using the CLIOS Process, discussed later in this paper and described in Dodder, et
al.(2), and Sussman, Sgouridis, and Ward (3).  Second, the Malaysian experience can serve as an
example for the United States as it expands the use of toll road PPPs over the coming years.
Several topics will be covered in the paper.  First, a general PPP background and framework are
developed for analyzing a toll road PPP program.  The Malaysian PPP program is then described
including its history, strengths, and weaknesses.  A discussion of the CLIOS Process, the results
of its application, and suggestions for improvements to the Malaysia toll road PPP program, both
at the national policy and project deployment levels, follow.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP BACKGROUND
Toll road PPPs are arrangements where the private sector takes more responsibility for
designing, constructing, financing, operating, or maintaining a road than under traditional
arrangements.  A common arrangement is the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO) model where the private sector will finance the construction,
operation, and maintenance of a road using toll revenue to recoup costs for a specified time
period.  Other arrangements are possible like the Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
arrangement for the Chicago Skyway which is being leased to the private sector for 99 years in
exchange for $1.8 billion (4).  While toll road PPP’s have only recently been used in the United
States, they are common in many other countries, particularly, but not exclusively, in the
developing world.
Benefits
Financial benefits are chief among the reasons for using toll road PPPs.  More infrastructure can
be provided by cash-strapped governments by involving the private sector.  The lifecycle costs
should also improve since the same company will be responsible for construction, operations,
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and maintenance costs rather than in traditional arrangements where the construction company’s
concern over long-term maintenance costs are secondary.  An O&M lease similar to the Chicago
Skyway’s lease can also provide needed funds to the government.
Equity investment in a toll road PPP can improve the long-term financial stability of the road
compared to a government toll road which may rely solely on bond funding.  Equity provides a
repayment cushion.  If revenue is lower than projected, the initial losses are incurred by the
equity investors while bondholders may still be receiving their payments as scheduled (5).  The
tradeoff is that the equity investors will expect a greater return on their investment than the
bondholders but the added stability may be well worth the cost given the high risk associated
with revenue projections.
Private sector operation can reduce political considerations that prevent the toll road from
operating at high efficiency.  Maintenance often gets short shrift when budgets are tight and
deferring it can further increase the cost.  By separating maintenance from government budgetary
processes, it can be performed on a cost efficient schedule using toll revenue.  Toll increases also
lag when requiring government approval since politicians are hesitant to incur voter anger over
the increases despite bond payment problems that may occur from insufficient revenue (6).  The
private sector will be more willing to raise tolls although concession agreements may limit their
ability to do so.
The greater financial incentives will also increase the concessionaire’s incentive to be innovative
in road operation.  California Route 91 and Toronto’s 407 ETR are two examples where
innovation occurred to enhance road efficiency and provide greater value to the customer (7).
Costs
A political cost may be created, depending on public attitudes towards toll road PPPs.  A public
accustomed to free roads will be wary of any toll road proposal, especially private sector roads
since the public’s perception may be that tolls are unnecessarily high to line the concessionaire’s
pockets.  The public may prefer a government run toll road with the expectation that tolls would
only go to paying for road construction or other transportation projects.  Politicians supportive of
toll road PPPs could suffer at the polls as opponents take advantage of public opinion.  Of
course, increasing necessary tax revenue for roads through other means will be unpopular too but
as the costs are more diffuse, the level of political activity likely will be less than when the costs
are concentrated on a specific, narrow population (8).
With multiple concessionaires, creating a standardized, integrated road network may become
more difficult.  While Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (9) note the issues surrounding physical design
and price standardization, an increasing issue with the growth of Intelligent Transportation
Systems is operational integration and standardization.  Concessionaires will pursue strategies
that improve revenue and these may not always be consistent from the customer’s point of view.
Malaysia’s Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) problems demonstrate what may occur.  Several
concessionaires in around Kuala Lumpur deployed ETC systems to improve operations.
Unfortunately, they used different standards, requiring customers to use numerous transponders
to navigate the toll road system (10).  This has only been recently resolved by government decree
with the Touch ‘N Go system.
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Risks
Toll road PPP’s are accompanied by a set of risks that must be balanced between the public and
private sectors to provide the best social value.  Indeed, the principle behind PPPs is that they are
a mechanism for equitably and effectively sharing various kinds of risk.  The government’s goal
should not be to simply transfer as much risk as possible to the private sector.  The goal should
be to create an arrangement that satisfies both government and private sector goals in such a way
that both parties are better off than they would be without a PPP arrangement.  This may mean
the government shoulders some risk to achieve goals beyond economic efficiency.  Much risk
should be transferred to the private sector but the government must remember that this must be
accompanied by a commensurate possibility of reward.  The ideal amount of risk to transfer is
often difficult to determine but some general rules apply.
Major risk categories include revenue risk, construction risk, financial risk, and political risk.
Revenue risk is the risk that toll revenue will be insufficient to meet financial obligations.  It is
the major component of total risk and is typically borne by the private sector.  Construction risk
is caused by construction delays and cost overruns for which the private sector is responsible.
Exchange rate risk and the debt/equity structuring of the PPP are part of financial risk with most
risk borne by the private sector.  Political risk covers a plethora of risks such as changes in
regulations, governments, and public opinion that may have significant impact on the
performance of the PPP.  There is not a standard division of political risk between public and
private sectors.  Spain is moving towards placing most risk for regulatory change on the private
sector (11) while Malaysia compensates its concessionaires if it does not permit increases in tolls
that are in the concession agreement (12).
While many of these risks are transferred to the private sector in a PPP, the government may
assume some of the risk to achieve its goals.  For example, domestic capital may be insufficient
to meet the goals of an ambitious expansion program while the necessary level of foreign
investment may create a greater than desired exposure to exchange rate risk.  The government
may provide guarantees to limit exchange rate exposure to draw in the necessary capital at an
acceptable cost to the private sector, transferring the additional costs to taxpayers.  The
government could also assume revenue or political risks to ensure social and environmental
goals are met.  For example, the government may provide low interest loans to prevent tolls from
making too great an impact on low income groups.
Supportable PPPs
A successful toll road PPP program must account for these factors and balance the needs of the
public with the goals of the private sector.  To this end, toll road PPP programs should try to
meet several principles for long term success:
• A supportive, transparent institutional framework is necessary.  Concessionaires must
know that the government will meet their agreements while the public must be confidant
that the process has produced a fair outcome.
• Risk should be allocated to the party best positioned to manage them as can best be
determined, given the government’s goals.
• The government should minimize the use of subsidies unless it is the only way to build a
needed road or if there are more urgent social needs.  Toll road investment is a risk and
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that risk includes significant financial losses.  A corollary is that the private sector should
have the opportunity for greater than expected returns.
• The public must be involved in the process.  The public can ruin a partnership if neither
public sector nor private sector involves them meaningfully in the process.
• The government should support innovation by integrating it into their bid procedures.
Permitting innovative, unsolicited proposals is one method to promote innovation.
MALAYSIA’S TOLL ROAD PPP PROGRAM
With a framework established for understanding toll road PPPs, we turn to Malaysia which has
relied on toll road PPPs for major highway infrastructure for over two decades.  General national
characteristics and a brief historical background are provided to help the reader understand how
the toll road PPP program was created and why certain policies were chosen.  Then, the toll road
PPP policy and proposal process is described using the concepts of the previous section.  Finally,
the program’s strengths and weaknesses are provided.
Malaysia is a nation in Southeast Asia slightly larger than New Mexico with two major
geographic areas.  Most of the population of 24 million lives on Peninsular Malaysia, to the
south of Thailand, and most economic activity occurs there.  The states of Sabah and Sarawak lie
on an island to the east shared with Indonesia and while the states are a sizable portion of
Malaysia’s total area, their population and economic importance is modest.
The ethnic makeup of Malaysia consists of ethnic Malay (referred to as Bumiputera) at 58% of
the population, Chinese with 24%, and Indians making up most of the remainder.  The economic
shares of each group are far different, which has driven many key policies since the late-1960s.
In 1970, Bumiputera controlled a mere 4% of corporate assets while the Chinese owned most of
the 34% of assets held by non-Bumiputera Malaysians (13).  Race riots erupted in 1969 between
the Bumiputera and Chinese over equity issues such as this economic imbalance.
History
The government’s response to the 1970 riots was to launch the New Economic Policy in 1971.
One part of this policy was the stated goal to reach corporate equity ownership levels of a
minimum 30% Bumiputera and 40% other Malaysian and a maximum 30% foreign ownership, a
goal which remains to this day.  Another major part of this policy was to improve the economic
competitiveness of Bumiputera.  The principal means for this was reliance on state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) with preferential employment for Bumiputera to develop their technical and
managerial skills.
This strategy ended in the early-1980s when Mahathir bin Mohammed became prime minister.
First, many SOEs were performing poorly while requiring large amounts of public resources and
the government felt competition was needed to fix this (14).  Second, the government expected
that the greater managerial work experience among Bumiputera developed over the past decade
would allow them to be more competitive.  A policy titled “Malaysia Incorporated” was
introduced in 1983 with the privatization of SOEs as the centerpiece.  One requirement was that
the equity of newly privatized entities must meet the 30% Bumiputera, 40% other Malaysian,
30% foreign equity ownership requirement.  The government could own equity in trust for the
Bumiputera.
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The Malaysian government included toll road PPPs along with other parts of the transportation
system such as ports and public transit in the privatization policy.  There are approximately 24
toll road PPPs that have either been completed or concession agreements signed, providing
nearly 1800 centerline kilometers.  Many are in the country’s economic and political center, the
Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Region (KLMR), but PPPs are also used for interurban service and
in some of the other cities.
Malaysia created an institutional and legal framework supportive of toll road PPPs.  The primary
law for toll road PPPs is the Federal Roads (Private Management) Act of 1984 which permits
private companies to collect and retain tolls on federal roads.  This law is administered by the
Prime Minister’s Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and its Privatization Committee.  The law
provides much latitude to the EPU in its implementation.
The Proposal Process
As shown in Figure 1, proposals for a toll road PPP may come from two sources: government
plans or private sector proposals.  There are no limits on the types of road proposals that may
come from the private sector, a policy characterized as “first-come, first-served” but the
government may reject ones that do not meet government goals.  For government proposals, the
government may select the companies allowed to bid rather than have a fully open competition.
Once the concession is awarded, the concessionaire will negotiate a contract with both technical
and financial subcommittees of the EPU’s Privatization Committee.  After the agreement is
signed, the Malaysia Highway Authority (MHA) monitors construction, operations, and
maintenance for the government.
The concession agreement is not rigid for the life of the contract; renegotiations are common due
to changing economic conditions, such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997, or unfavorable
public opinion.  Reductions in expected future income for the concessionaire due to the
renegotiations are compensated for by the government.  Cash payments and an extension of the
concession period are the two most common forms of compensation.  The government has also
used construction contracts for untolled, non-PPP roads or the award of additional concessions.
In comparison to planning processes in the United States, Malaysia’s has much less public
participation and transparency and a weaker environmental approval process.  Public
participation is not required for the process.  According to the website for one embattled project,
the Penang Outer Ring Road (PORR), it was the first toll road PPP to include public
participation during the approval process, occurring in the 2002-2003 timeframe (15).  The
process is also secretive, aided by the Official Secrets Act of 1986 which permits the government
to classify a wide variety of documents.  If there is a competition, the evaluation criteria are not
always clear and historically they have been used to reward politically connected
concessionaires.  The largest concession, the North-South Expressway, was awarded to the firm
with the third lowest proposed toll (16).  At the time, this firm was owned by the leading political
party, UMNO (17).  Environmental damage does not appear to prevent a toll road from being
approved although the process seems to concentrate on finding an acceptably low damage
solution with the proviso that the road will be built.
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Figure 1 - Malaysia Toll Road PPP Project Deployment Process
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Strengths and Weaknesses
Malaysia’s toll road PPP program displays several strengths.  The most obvious strength is that
the government has used the toll road PPP program to provide a lot of infrastructure despite the
Ward and Sussman      9
weaknesses of the program.  The government has also shown a high degree of institutional
support for the program from the conception of the road to its operation.  The private sector can
propose toll roads rather than waiting for a government proposal, which increases the rate of
network expansion and resulting economic development.  It is unclear how detailed the proposals
need to be or if the government merely approves or rejects the proposal or if it may modify the
proposal with the private sector company before approving or rejecting.  The EPU is given
flexibility in negotiating the terms of the contract so that the project can be feasibly carried out.
If conditions drastically change to the disadvantage of the concessionaire, the government is
usually willing to renegotiate the terms of the contract.  Institutional roles are clearly delineated;
the EPU handles all proposals, coordinating as needed with other departments, and the MHA
monitors the post-negotiation phases.
While Malaysia’s program has been successful in providing hundreds of kilometers of needed
roads, it also has a few weaknesses which may impact the long-term stability of the sector.  The
chief weaknesses involve the management of political risk with the low transparency and
minimal public involvement throughout the process.  This breeds the belief that the concessions
are awarded based on political connections rather than societal benefit.  Protests have occurred
that forced the government to limit proposed toll rate increases and to renegotiate agreements
with concessionaires (18).  Since the government compensates the concessionaire for foregone
revenue, the result is to shift some of the financial burden from users to taxpayers at large.
There are some other weaknesses with Malaysia’s process that are linked to the previous two
problems.  However, the lack of transparency does make it difficult to determine their extent.
Financial viability may have greater importance in decision-making than the road’s place within
an integrated regional transportation network.  This may result in more highway infrastructure
than desirable since the government can have it built without using its own funds unlike other
transportation infrastructure.  The award criteria are also difficult to discern.  The prime criterion
is assumedly the lowest toll but the minimal transparency and past decisions such as with the
North-South Expressway make this assumption questionable.
DIAGNOSIS BASED ON CLIOS PROCESS
An alternative to existing Malaysian toll road PPP policies was developed using the CLIOS
Process (2)(3).  This process is intended to tackle complex, sociotechnical problems in an
integrated manner.  Its approach to systems is to view them as a physical “domain” nested within
an institutional “sphere”, as shown in Figure 2, and that strategic alternatives that are chosen to
change the outcome of the system can involve either the physical domain or institutional sphere.
We applied the CLIOS Process to Malaysia’s toll road PPP program, considering the realities of
the political situation.
As shown in Figure 3, the CLIOS Process has three stages encompassing 12 steps.  The first
stage involves representing the physical system and institutional sphere so that relationships
between components, feedback loops, or other interactions can be recognized.  With a system
representation in hand, the process continues to the next stage where strategic alternatives are
designed and evaluated based on the system representation.  A robust bundle of strategic
alternatives is then selected that should perform reasonably well across a variety of scenarios.
The final stage involves implementing the strategic alternatives in both the physical domain and
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on the institutional sphere, monitoring their performance, and preparing to go through the
process again based on the results.  The quantitative and qualitative tools required for the process
will depend on the system under analysis.
Figure 2 - Nested Complexity,  Source:(2)
Institutional 
Sphere Physical domain 
In order to apply the CLIOS Process as a diagnostic tool for toll road PPPs, it was necessary to
conceptually divide the toll road PPP program into two parts and then apply the CLIOS Process
separately to each part.  First, a general Malaysian toll road PPP policy, dubbed here “Enabling
PPP Policy” and similar to federal legislation in the United States, must be developed that
delineates the conditions under which a PPP may be used.  This drives the creation of a legal and
institutional framework that is consistent with the aims of the policy.  Concerns for the Enabling
PPP Policy may include transparency, foreign financing requirements, the ability of domestic
markets to support large scale toll road PPP programs, and even equity distribution between
ethnic groups.  The second part of the program is called here “PPP Project Deployment”.  This
part involves choosing projects and structuring their concession agreements in a way that is
consistent with both the Enabling PPP Policy and with the objectives of the transportation plan.
Public support, specific financing structures for the project, right-of-way acquisition, and toll rate
regulation will be of more importance here.  In both parts, the context is that the government
agencies can use the CLIOS Process to develop new policies in place of their existing processes.
Enabling PPP Policy
Key steps in the development of the new Enabling PPP Policy using the CLIOS Process include
developing the issue checklist, refining the system goals with the aid of selected performance
measures, and representing the institutional sphere so that institutional issues could be identified
more quickly.  These steps are expected to raise the priority of issues like operations, ITS
technology, and economic development by better understanding how the transportation system
works and how it interacts with the traveler and other areas of society.  Selection of strategic
alternatives was aided by the refined goals with an eye towards ease of implementation and
expected performance.  The institutional sphere representation was also helpful in selecting
strategic alternatives that are expected to be acceptable politically rather than selecting purely on
technical performance.
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Figure 3 - The CLIOS Process
The following strategic alternatives were chosen for the Enabling PPP Policy in the first
application of the CLIOS process.  Other alternatives were considered but the ones selected are
expected to provide a robust, well-performing policy package.  Most of these strategic
alternatives are targeted towards managing the toll road PPP program’s political risk.  An in-
depth discussion of why these alternatives were selected is provided in Ward (1):
Selected Strategic Alternatives:
• Any PPP arrangement is permitted – DBFO, O&M, etc.
• Open competition is required for non-innovative toll road PPPs with published selection
criteria and the release of the relevant information from each proposal for the selection
criteria.  Enough information must be provided to reassure the public that the process is
fair.
• Private sector toll road proposals will be accepted if the government deems them
innovative.
• Toll road PPPs must comply with standards for ETC, ATIS, and CVO technologies to
ensure efficient system operation.
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• Stakeholders including citizen groups, shippers, and carriers, will be allowed to
participate in a non-binding manner in the technical design phase of PPP Project
Deployment.  Other stakeholder involvement is optional.
• A quick environmental assessment must be successfully completed before environmental
approval negotiations can begin and a comparison with the no-build alternative will be
part of this assessment.  An in-depth investigation will be done during the technical
design phase.
• The minimum 30% Bumiputera/ maximum 30% foreign equity ownership requirement
remains.
• The PPP Project Deployment process is handled at the regional level.
This selection of alternatives still provides considerable flexibility to the government for the PPP
Project Deployment process and should also be more acceptable to the public than the current
process.  The Enabling PPP Policy should increase the value to society of the projects developed
using the revamped PPP Project Deployment process, to be discussed next, by recognizing the
need for local involvement in the process while still providing a wide range of alternatives for
the agency managing the PPP Project Deployment process.  With this flexibility and expected
public acceptance, the Enabling PPP Policy should be robust enough to perform well in a variety
of future scenarios.
Given Malaysia’s toll road history, the policy’s allowance for innovative toll roads may be
problematic.  It should be permitted as an incentive to the private sector to develop new ways for
meeting transportation needs.  It should not be a loophole to reward companies but given past
occurrences, the public may view it as such.  A credible agency would need to have oversight
over determining if a proposal is innovative and the EPU probably does not have this.
Unfortunately, space limitations do not permit us to fully explore this issue here.  While
innovative proposals should be encouraged, the focus for the rest of this paper will be on toll
road PPPs that come from government plans.
PPP Project Deployment
With an Enabling PPP Policy in place, PPP Project Deployment can be explored.  Two
assumptions made for this process are that:
1) Toll road PPP decisions are now made during regional strategic transportation
planning (RSTP)
2) The CLIOS Process is used for RSTP, as described in Sussman, Sgouridis, and
Ward (3).
For the first two stages of the CLIOS Process, toll road PPPs are treated as one of many possible
strategic alternatives.  Once the transportation planning agency decides to use a toll road PPP,
the focus becomes how to deploy the toll road PPP in a manner consistent with the aims of the
Enabling PPP Policy.  In this section, we consider how this may occur in a generic manner for
Malaysia as well as applying it to the Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Region (KLMR) to provide a
concrete example.
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s capital, is Malaysia’s top metropolitan area with a regional
population of approximately 4 million.  Key features include Malaysia’s major port, Port Klang,
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which is striving to become the top port in Southeast Asia; the development of a new
government center outside Kaula Lumpur’s city limits called Putrajaya; the creation of a
technology development center named Cyberjaya, a Malaysian version of Silicon Valley, near
Putrajaya; and the 7-year old Kuala Lumpur International Airport.  This region includes portions
of the state of Selangor as well as the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, increasing the
institutional complexity.
An important first step even before applying the CLIOS Process is to identify the agencies
involved with RSTP and PPP Project Deployment. As noted earlier, the current toll road PPP
program is run by the Prime Minister’s EPU.  While this ensures uniformity throughout the
country, it can lead to an emphasis on national concerns at the expense of regional issues.  This
will foster some regional distrust of the process.  By distributing decision-making power to
regional transportation planning agencies, toll road PPPs should better meet regional concerns
while also being better integrated into the regional transportation network, one reason the new
Enabling PPP Policy shifts it to the regional level.  For most of Malaysia’s metropolitan regions,
State Planning Committees (SPCs) are the appropriate agencies for this planning work.  KLMR
is a special case due to its multi-jurisdictional nature.  A regional transportation agency that
coordinates the actions of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur with the State of Selangor is
more appropriate for ensuring regional concerns are met.
This shift in decision-making power will surely face institutional resistance from federal
agencies.  Given the modest resources given to SPCs and the proposed KLMR planning agency,
the EPU and other national agencies will still play an important role which may reduce some of
the resistance.  As pointed out by Naidu and Yaacob (19), the EPU has the experience in
negotiating concession agreements and inexperienced state or regional negotiators may produce
worse results for the public without the EPU’s assistance.  The Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment will influence the environmental approval process for PPP projects thanks to
the requirements of the Enabling PPP Policy.  If government financial support is needed, it will
be requested through the Ministry of Finance since individual states do not have the financial
resources for their own PPPs.   The multi-jurisdictional nature of KLMR further complicates
these issues.  These arrangements will give the national government an influential role over the
proceedings but greater regional decision-making power should ameliorate local concerns.
The RSTP process covers long-term transportation concerns, similar to the long-range
transportation plan created by Metropolitan Planning Organizations in the United States; of
course, they are concerned with more than just toll road PPPs.  The Representation Stage for
RSTP is unchanged with the inclusion of PPP Project Deployment.  In the Design, Evaluation,
and Selection stage, toll road PPPs would be handled as one strategic alternative that can be
compared with a free road, a government toll road, transit, or others of that nature.  The strategic
alternative that best meets the needs of the region in a robust manner should be chosen.  While
the ability to have the private sector, and thus toll road users, pay for it should be considered, it
should not be the only factor in the decision.
The main changes caused by including PPP Project Deployment in RSTP are during the
Implementation stage.  Given that a toll road PPP is the chosen strategic alternative, it is put out
for bid using the procedures developed in the Enabling PPP Policy, including requirements for
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transparency and public participation.  Once a winner is selected using the award criteria made
public per the Enabling PPP Policy, the regional transportation agency would handle concession
agreement negotiations with the winner.  The EPU would provide significant help to ensure that
a deal is reached that is expected to meet both public and private sector goals in a financially
acceptable manner.  Construction and operation would be monitored by the MHA to ensure that
the terms of the concession agreement are met, although these functions, particularly operations
monitoring, may eventually be assumed by regional agencies.  If the concessionaire wishes to
renegotiate the concession agreement due to unforeseen, drastic changes in operating conditions,
it would have to meet with the regional transportation agency to discuss its concerns.
Appropriate national agencies would be involved depending on the subject of the renegotiations.
A critical change for the new PPP Project Deployment process will be a more robust stakeholder
involvement process.  Currently, there is no requirement for the public to be involved in the
process.  The Penang state government claims that the public involvement process for PORR
was the first of its kind in Malaysia (15).  This type of involvement where the public is allowed
to comment on the project for a period of time should be replicated elsewhere.  These comments
should be treated as advisory.  This low level of public involvement may be acceptable to the
government whereas pursuing anything further would meet too much political resistance as it
threatens the government’s decision-making power.  Stakeholder involvement also implies that
stakeholders such as freight carriers and other affected businesses should be included but the
current government seems to meet their needs adequately already.
Another proposed change involves transparency.  As noted earlier, the existing process is fairly
secretive.  Given this behavior, achieving a level of transparency similar to the United States
would be difficult due to institutional resistance.  Mild improvements in transparency such as
making public the award criteria and the information from each bid related to those criteria
should improve public confidence in the process.
Benefits and Costs of the New Process
With the additional transparency, the political and financial performance of the sector should
improve.  Financially, more companies will be able to compete for toll roads as the process
becomes less constrained by political considerations.  The ethnic ownership and limited foreign
ownership requirements will limit full competition between potential concessionaires but these
are necessary in the near term to achieve other government goals.
With greater transparency and public involvement, political risk should be reduced.  This risk has
been problematic for the toll road PPP program as toll increases have been limited due to public
pressure, leading to compensation from the government to the concessionaires.  As the public has
a greater voice in the process and has greater exposure to the reasons behind certain decisions,
their mistrust of the program should lessen.  Proposed toll increases may still be reduced or
delayed in the future but with greater public knowledge of the workings of the program, these
events should be less frequent.  This arrangement should keep the revenue risk with the private
sector rather than shifting some of the burden to taxpayers-at-large as happens with guaranteed
compensation.
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Of course, these changes will not be easy.  If the Malaysian government has been awarding
concessions to favored companies, these companies will use their political influence to prevent
increases in transparency or public involvement.  The power to award concessions provides key
politicians a lever to gain support from the business community and these politicians will fight to
retain this lever.  Government officials involved in concession negotiations or the regulatory
process may not like sacrificing the flexibility to do as they see fit and will also work to prevent
the changes or they may not follow the spirit of the new policies.
The increased public involvement could lead to cost increases from design changes that far
exceed gains from additional competition.  The higher costs could make the investment unwise,
reducing the total infrastructure built as a few potential toll roads would not be expected to
generate the necessary revenue.  Political sensitivity is difficult to determine but in difficult
economic times or if the majority party is declining in power, it should be expected that public
concerns will be given more importance even if technically or financially unwise.  This is not to
say all additional costs should be avoided; some may be due to the internalization of costs that
were previously externalities.
CONCLUSION
Malaysia has relied on toll road PPPs to provide necessary highway infrastructure for over two
decades.  The program is successful overall but there are some problems due to the lack of
transparency and low public involvement that pervades the program.  This has led to reductions
or delays in proposed tolls, although the government has reduced this risk by providing
compensation to the concessionaire.  While these actions may build confidence in the program
by the private sector, it may also distort the financial risk to investors.  This policy may also be
an expensive way for the government to manage political risk.
Given the direct financial impact on travelers, the government must ensure that a toll road PPP
program operates in a transparent manner.  This will reduce the long-term risk to the sector from
political instability.  This has only been a minor issue in Malaysia due to the large amount of
power held by the national government and the amount of deference accorded it by the public.
The Malaysian approach would be more problematic in nations where the national government
had less power or the public held less trust in government actions.
New policies developed using the CLIOS Process are proposed in this paper to meet Malaysia’s
challenges that are also intended to be consistent with the political climate.  Greater
transparency, more public involvement, and the shift in decision-making power to regional or
local agencies are the three major changes.  While not nearly as strong as similar policies in the
United States, the proposed changes should increase public confidence in the government’s
decisions and the long-term stability of the toll road PPP industry in Malaysia.
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